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Provocateurs
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*

When a provocateur intentionally provokes a deadly affray, the law of self-defense holds that the
provocateur may not use deadly force to defend himself. Why is this so?
Provocateurs are often seen as just one example of the problem of actio libera in causa, the causing of
the conditions of one’s defense. This article rejects theories that maintain a one-size-fits-all approach to
actio libera in causa, and argues that provocateurs need specific rules about why they forfeit their
defensive rights. This article further claims that provocateurs need to be distinguished from their
cousins, initial aggressors, as initial aggressors engage in conduct that grounds the permissibility of the
defender’s behavior whereas the provocateur’s behavior does not justify the respondent’s use of force
against him. In addition, this article rejects that the basis of this forfeiture can be found in the doctrines
surrounding when and why mitigation for provocation is appropriate for the respondent.
Provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights for the very simple reason that they start the fight. This
forfeiture occurs when they behave culpably, meaning that they subjectively appreciate that they are
running the risk of causing force to be used against them and they engage in this behavior without
justification or excuse. The question of when the provocateur’s behavior is justified is incredibly complex.
It requires analysis of when it is that one is justified in increasing the risk of another’s wrongdoing. Any
analysis of this justification must take seriously the liberty rights of the potential provocateur to engage
in otherwise permissible behavior. Moreover, the determination of whether the provocateur is justified
will turn on whether the later acts that he puts into motion are themselves justified. Thus, when Charles
Bronson in the movie Death Wish presents himself as a victim so that muggers will attack him, the
justifiability of his conduct in appearing as a vulnerable victim will turn on whether he is entitled to
engage in this conduct, intending to later defend himself. This article argues that in Death Wish-type
cases, the reason that the provocateur is not justified is because he becomes a vigilante, thereby
usurping the role of the state and undermining rule of law values.
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Provocateurs often have others do their dirty work, but they still bear responsibility for creating risks of
harm. For example, Iago taunts Othello with false claims that Desdemona is unfaithful. As we know,
Othello kills Desdemona. But if Iago had the ability to stop Othello, it seems clear that he should harm
Othello or harm himself to save Desdemona. Because his actions provoked Othello’s conduct, Iago now
not only may, but must, act so as to stop the harm to an innocent.
Things, however, are far more complicated when the provocateur provokes harm to himself. Consider
one judge’s hypothetical:
Imagine a funeral ceremony with hundreds of mourners for a widely respected AfricanAmerican civil rights leader. A white supremacist appears at the church and begins shouting
nonthreatening, racial epithets. Enraged mourners rush the person, who pulls out a concealed
gun and kills several of them.1
Unlike Iago, who must act, here, our intuitions seem to support the opposite. The white supremacist is
not permitted to kill the enraged mourners. Indeed, even those with potentially more other-regarding
motives seem suspect. Consider the movie Death Wish in which Charles Bronson sets himself up to
appear as a vulnerable victim so that others will try to harm him and he may act in self-defense.
Across jurisdictions, the white supremacist’s and Bronson’s claims of self-defense will likely fail. For
example, according to the Model Penal Code: “The use of deadly force is not justifiable if … the actor,
with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in
the same encounter…”2 Indeed, most jurisdictions have even broader forfeiture doctrines. They do not
require a purpose to cause death or serious bodily harm, but just bodily injury, nor do they limit the
provocation to the same encounter.3 Generally, when one intentionally provokes another (a person
whom I will call “the respondent”), the provocateur is barred from using deadly force to defend himself
from the attack that he provoked. For purposes of this paper, I will focus on deadly force forfeiture,
though my thesis will have implications for the resort to lesser degrees of force.
The provocateur is frequently viewed as just one example of actio libera in causa cases. Actio libera in
causa is the name given by German theorists to those cases in which the defendant causes the
conditions of his own defense.4 For example, if Albert wants to kill Betty but is afraid he will not get up
the courage to do so, he may take a hallucinogen at t1 that will render him violent at t2 when he knows
he will be alone with her. It seems clear that Albert has purposefully killed Betty despite the fact that his
mental state is temporally disconnected from his actus reus. If Carl recklessly starts a fire at t1 that

1

State v. Riley, 976 P.2d 624, 631 (Wash. 1999)(en banc)(Talmadge, J. concurring).
Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b).
3
See, e.g., Ala.Code 1975 § 13A-3-23; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-3-21; State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 278 (Minn.
2003)(provoking “the difficulty”); Mt. St. § 45-3-105; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 627:4; U.C.A. 1953 § 76-2-402.
4
See Finkelstein and Katz (2008, p. 480 n.2). It originally applied only to cases in which the defendant rendered
himself irresponsible, but has since been generalized to other defenses. Id. at 482.
2
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requires a firebreak at t2, it seems clear that he should purposefully destroy property at t2 to create the
firebreak, but he bears some responsibility for so doing.5
Criminal statutes that deny the defense in actio libera in causa cases do so in problematic and
haphazard ways. Consider the following problems Paul Robinson notes with current formulations.
Proportionality: Some statutes provide that an individual who provokes a fist fight loses the right to
employ deadly force when his insult is met with gunfire.6 Strict Liability: In some jurisdictions, the
statutory term “provoke” could be interpreted to depend only on the effect on the respondent, such
that, to use Robinson’s example, one can provoke one’s neighbor (and thereby lose one’s defensive
rights) by painting one’s house a color that incites the neighbor.7 Culpability Mismatches: Some
jurisdictions do not take into account the differences in the culpability in causing and the culpability of
the later act.8 We may doubt that a person who negligently starts a fire should be held responsible for
purposeful destruction of property when he creates a firebreak.
Fixing statutes, however, requires that we understand the substantive principles at work, and theorists
have offered us different accounts of the underlying rationale for the treatment of these cases.9 It has
often been assumed that we can solve all actio libera in causa cases the same way. Indeed, Paul
Robinson extols the benefit of his approach in offering one unified theory across defenses.10 The
reasoning seems to be that what is good for necessity or intoxication is good for provocateurs. The
purpose of this paper is to show that that assumption is wrong.
This paper will focus on provocateurs because they present two particularly interesting problems. The
first is to explain how it is that provocateurs can lose their defensive rights without grounding the
respondent’s right to react. That is, when the white supremacist provokes the enraged mourners, they
still do wrong by attacking him. This is to be contrasted with self-defense where the initial aggressor’s
attack simultaneously forfeits the aggressor’s rights and grounds the permissibility of the defender’s
response.11 My aim therefore is to understand what is going on with respect to the moral terrain – how
and why do provocateurs lose these rights? Although my argument is largely consistent with existing
law, my goal is not to rationalize it but merely to use existing legal standards as some evidence of our
reflective judgments about these cases. The white supremacist seems to be a compelling case for why
some provocateurs cannot fight back. The goal is to understand why.

5

Actio libera in causa technically includes only those who purposefully contrive the conditions. Actio illicita in
causa is the term used when individuals are only aware, but do not intend, to create the conditions. See id. n.3.
For our purposes, nothing turns on this.
6
Robinson (1985, p. 13). Despite the fact that Robinson wrote this paper over three decades ago, little has
changed with respect to the problems with statutory formulations.
7
Id. at 5-6.
8
Id. at 18.
9
E.g., Alexander (this issue); DeGirolami (2009); Finkelstein and Katz (2008); Herrmann (1986); Robinson (1985).
10
Robinson (1985). But see Herrmann (1986) (noting the complexities in German law that Robinson’s unified
approach runs roughshod over).
11
For ease of exposition, I am bypassing the nuances in self-defense. My only aim here is to draw the contrast.
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The second puzzle takes us into the depths of Death Wish and cases like it. It is not altogether clear how
to determine whether the provocateur’s action is culpable, or blameworthy, or impermissible at t1. One
may know he is inciting a bully by leaving one’s home. One may know she is encouraging rapists by
dressing scantily. But we are free to leave our homes and dress immodestly. Knowledge that one might
have to fend off the bully or the rapist does not render this conduct culpable or impermissible. And
even with the person who purposefully engages in conduct so as to kill his attacker, why is the question,
“Is it permissible to provoke this person so he will attack me so I can kill him?” rather than “Is it
permissible to provoke a person so he will attack me so that I may justifiably kill him?” That is, if all we
have at t2 is a dead respondent who impermissibly tried to kill the provocateur, then what has the
provocateur done wrong?12
Ultimately, I will claim that the actions of both provocateurs and their cousins, initial aggressors, alter
the moral landscape at t1. We have normative powers by which we can change rights and duties; for
example we can alter our property rights with gifts, permissions, and abandonment. Provocateurs
change the moral relationship with the respondent. By consciously creating the unjustifiable risk of
causing the respondent to attack him, the provocateur forfeits his right to defend against such an attack
at t2. Necessity and intoxication do not change the rights and duties between two parties. Aggressors
and provocateurs do.
As to the second question, I will distinguish some instances of impermissible provocation from others.
In some instances, the problem is simply that the provocateur is acting impermissibly, whereas other
instances present a problem akin to entrapment. With respect to the latter cases and police
entrapment, the problem is not that the provocateur or police behave in a way that exculpates the
respondent/defendant. Rather, the problem is that there is something seemingly problematic about
significant alterations of another’s circumstantial luck. We worry that there is something unfair about
being forced to confront challenges that would otherwise not occur, challenges that bring out the worst
in us. I will not answer the boundaries for police conduct. With respect to provocateurs, however, I
argue that their efforts to play both God and state render them moral and political vigilantes that
destroy rule of law values. With respect to private citizens, any act meant to alter another’s
circumstantial luck for the purpose of sitting in judgment upon it is impermissible. Accordingly, at least
when there is a reasonably well functioning state, individual citizens are not permitted to provoke
impermissible conduct so that they may act as state.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I will survey three approaches to actio libera in causa in the
literature, those of Larry Alexander, Paul Robinson, and Marc DeGirolami, all three of which presuppose
a single solution to the problem, and I will argue that all three answers are ill-suited to solve the
provocateur problem. Part II argues that the reason we cannot use a “one size fits all” approach is
because self-defense is not best understood as simply part of a lesser-evils analysis. Rather, what initial
aggressors do is to become liable to the force used against them. Part II argues that we need something
12

Finkelstein and Katz pose this question in the context of comparing actio libera in causa to deterrent threats. If
one endorses what they dub the Backward Induction View that it is impermissible to threaten what it is
impermissible to do, then by the same reasoning, the permissibility of self-defense at t2 would justify the
provocateur’s action at t1. See Finkelstein and Katz (2008, pp. 500-501).
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akin to the liability principle to explain why provocateurs cannot fight back. Part III looks for this
forfeiture concept in the doctrines surrounding the provocation mitigation defense, but ultimately
concludes that an understanding of provocateurs and actio libera in causa cannot be derived from an
understanding of when respondents are entitled to mitigation, even under a partial justification view of
provocation. Part IV sets out the positive claim that the reason why provocateurs lose their defensive
rights is that they cannot complain about and defend against a risk that they themselves impermissibly
created. Part IV also argues that this forfeiture doctrine requires subjective appreciation of this risk, and
that the creation of the risk must itself be unjustifiable. Part IV then explores the unjustifiability
criterion and concludes by claiming that what is going on in the Bronson-type cases is that some
provocateurs, in a way akin to entrapment, impermissibly alter another’s circumstantial luck in order to
induce the crime. Because this is something which they lack standing to do, they threaten rule of law
values in a way that renders their conduct at t1 impermissible.

I.

Why Other Approaches to Actio Libera in Causa Don’t Solve the Provocateur Problem

A. Alexander’s Solution to the Non-Problem of Actio Libera in Causa
In accord with Larry Alexander’s contribution to this symposium, I think we can and should, for the most
part, analyze actio libera in causa cases in two stages.13 The question is when does the actor consciously
disregard and unleash a substantial and unjustifiable risk. If at t1 Ben sets a fire to kill Joe, but has also
risked harm to countless others, then at t1 he is responsible for this culpable action.14 In addition, by
unleashing this risk, Ben is now under a duty to prevent the harm from occurring when possible, and so,
he has additional culpability for the duration of his failing to rescue. Indeed, Alexander and I have
previously bitten the bullet that if Ben shoots Joe at t1, but can save Joe at t2, but does not, then Ben is
guilty of two crimes – one for the risking and one for the omitting.15
This approach resolves the question of what to do when Iago provokes Othello to kill Desdemona. Iago
increases the risk of harm to Desdemona (and for those who care about results, bears responsibility for
her death) because he does two things. First, he influences Othello’s reasons. He gives Othello a reason
to act that did not exist before. Second, he influences Othello’s rationality. He appeals to Othello’s
anger and jealousy.16 Iago unleashes the risk at t1, and at t2, he has a duty to rescue Desdemona if
13

Alexander (forthcoming).
As Alexander and I argue in our book, results do not matter so the offense is complete at the moment the risk is
unleashed. Alexander and Ferzan (2009, ch. 5).
15
Id. at 242.
16
Although because provocateurs “provoke,” we might think they are conceptually limited to those who cause
anger, it is important to note that either reason-giving or rationality-influencing behavior may be individually
sufficient for blameworthiness. In the first case, someone who solicits a hit man or joins a conspiracy increases the
risk of harm to a victim by giving another person reasons to harm her without impairing the other person’s
rationality. In the second case, one might, for example, involuntarily intoxicate someone who is about to drive
home. Such conduct does not give the driver new reasons for action, but still increases the harm to others and is
thus blameworthy.
14
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possible. (There is a rather large puzzle embedded in the deceptively simple claim to which I cannot do
justice here, but will also allude to later. This is the question of the degree of responsibility we bear for
our increasing the risk that others will do wrong.)
This position then entails that if Iago creates a destructive robot programmed to kill Desdemona, or
places hallucinogens in Othello’s cup and feeds him lies, then Iago actually has a duty to rescue
Desdemona to prevent the peril that he has created. One may even think that if Othello is about to
shoot Desdemona, then Iago ought to throw himself in the bullet’s path.17 The criminal law seems to
capture this sort of continuing duty in its requirement in both solicitation and conspiracy cases that
defendants, to avail themselves of an abandonment defense, must not only abandon their criminal
purpose but also thwart the success of others.18 Once you light a fuse, it is your responsibility to stomp
it out.
All of this is well and good because thus far we have only been dealing with the bullet that the
provocateur has to take to prevent harm to others. The more complicated question is how to translate
this principle when we are dealing with the relationship between the provocateur and the respondent.
If at t1 the provocateur engages in conduct that provokes the respondent to try to harm him, he has
curiously made himself both agent and victim. He has unleashed an unjustified risk of harm to himself!
Although he typically would be under a duty to stop the harm to others, it seems that the exact opposite
is true, which is that he is not permitted to intervene – he may not defend himself.
Alexander simply denies this. He claims that an actor may act at t2; he does have a right to self-defense.
The culpability is complete at t1. The analysis would then run that the provocateur is guilty of attempted
murder at t1 (which Alexander would punish the same as murder (as would I)), but that at t2, the
respondent performs a completely unjustified action because the respondent is using unlawful force
against the provocateur and the provocateur is entitled to defend against this. Alexander thus deems
the provocateur’s behavior at t1 to be irrelevant to the t2 analysis for these cases.

Doctrinally, the criminal law, because of its view that voluntary human actors cut causal chains, offers different
accounts for these two sorts of behaviors. The first are dealt with through complicity, conspiracy, and other
doctrines that do not assume the actor causes the result. The latter are dealt with by assuming that when one acts
through an innocent or irrational person, there is no voluntary human action cutting the causal chain. This clear
doctrinal split is exactly what gets complicity into trouble when it attempts to deal with Iago, as he both
contributes to reasons and rationality. Cf. Williams (1961, p. 391)(offering a theoretical account that allows Iago to
receive greater punishment than Othello, contra the criminal law’s general stance that accessorial liability is
derivative of the principal’s).
Of course, if we abandon the idea that humans somehow have contra-causal freedom that cuts causal chains, we
can avoid such doctrinal anomalies. For those of us who think that results do not matter, it is as simple as asking
whether someone is culpable at t1 for increasing the risk of harm to others by giving reasons or intoxicants. And,
even for those who think that results matter, a cleaner analysis is available. For instance, Michael Moore thinks
that we do not need a doctrine of accomplice liability, as causing someone to have a reason to act is still causing.
Moore (2009, pp. 299-301).
17
Tadros (2011, p. 53).
18
MPC §§ 5.02; 5.03(6).
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Alexander argues that the way we ought to reason about these cases is to look at the t2 culpability of the
provocateur and the respondent and figure out the side on which a third party should intervene. Four
points on this. First, I reject at least one of Alexander’s substantive conclusions about the relative
culpability of the actors. With respect to Desdemona, there is a strong argument that if Othello kills her,
then Othello ought only to be guilty of manslaughter, but Iago ought to be guilty of murder. So, why
conclude that Iago is less culpable when it is just between Othello and Iago? Second, when deciding
between two culpable actors, we might think that there are factors that matter besides the relative
culpability. That is, in the way that Alexander advocates a broader inquiry when we are comparing
innocents,19 why would we not also need a broad inquiry to determine which bad guy to choose? This
raises a third question. Why think that third parties ought to intervene when both sides are in the
wrong? And finally, we might think that there are times when the objective reasons that third parties
have to act do not apply to the interpersonal dispute because of the way that the parties have altered
their normative relationship.
More generally, this approach, which gives the provocateur a clean slate at t2, ignores the provocateur’s
role in orchestrating the entire conflict to begin with. It seems relevant to the question of who may act
against whom that the provocateur is the author of the entire controversy. Indeed, given the similarity
that provocateurs bear to initial aggressors, it seems quite plausible that the t1 conduct should be
morally relevant to the rights held at t2. Moreover, there is some sense that the provocateur gets to
have his cake and eat it too, as even though he will be held morally responsible for his t1 act, the t2 act –
the very conduct that he culpably concocted – is immunized from interference. Even though to both
Alexander and me results don’t matter, it seems somewhat odd that the provocateur gets a free pass to
kill the respondent.20

B. Robinson’s Unified Approach to Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense
Paul Robinson’s approach fares no better. Robinson proposes a single principle to apply across different
defenses.21 He argues that
Where the actor is not only culpable as to causing the defense conditions, but also has a
culpable state of mind as to causing himself to engage in conduct constituting the offense, the
state should be [sic] punish him for causing the ultimate justified or excused conduct. His
punishment, however, is properly based on his initial conduct of causing the defense conditions

19

Alexander (1993, p. 61).
Although I believe there are broader principles at work here, one might think that even under Alexander’s view,
the principles of “abuse of right” and/or “no man should profit from his own wrong” would have purchase. That is,
even if one thought that the provocateur still had a right to defend himself, one might think that he ought not to
be permitted to act on this right because of his unclean hands in bringing about the affray. Without such a
principle, the provocateur may be fully culpable at t1 but he then gets the benefit of his wrongful conduct at t 2 by
being able to accomplish the result. (I thank Ben Zipursky for suggesting the “abuse of rights” possibility.)
21
Robinson (1985, p. 26).
20
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with his accompanying scheming intention, not on the justified or excused conduct he
subsequently performs.22
According to Robinson, we take the provocateur’s culpability at t1 and link it to the result caused at t2,
but grant the provocateur a justification defense at t2. This is intelligible (though I don’t endorse the
approach) for something like necessity. If Joe starts a fire negligently at t1, and creates a firebreak at t2,
then the two can be combined such that although there was a purposeful harm at t2, a crime with a
negligence mens rea is that for which Joe will ultimately be held liable.
However, with respect to provocateurs, it seems rather odd to say that purposeful engagement in
conduct at t1 renders one criminally culpable for murder because a dead body is caused at t2, but one is
justified for the act of killing at t2. Under traditional analysis, it is not clear how Robinson gets to attach
the result to the t1 conduct because the respondent’s behavior should be a voluntary action that cuts
the causal chain. So, it isn’t clear why Robinson gets to help himself to the resulting dead body.
If we need the t1 behavior to have moral relevance for how we view the interaction between the
provocateur and the respondent, then is it not far more plausible to claim that the act the provocateur
is not permitted to do just is engage in the killing at t2? However, if provocateurs cause the conditions
of their own defense and by that act forfeit the right to defend themselves then we need to understand
how or why that happens, and Robinson’s approach to other actio libera in causa cases is not going to
get us there.
C. DeGirolami’s Approach to Culpability and Justification
Marc DeGirolami advances a third approach to the puzzle, arguing that “created culpability” alters the
later t2 act in such a way that it is no longer justified.23 DeGirolami’s argument is that when a defendant
has a culpable hand at t1 in creating the situation at t2, we must reassess whether the t2 conduct is
socially valuable such that it ought to be deemed justified. Unfortunately, I think this approach, while
gesturing in the right direction, ultimately fails as both as an approach for necessity and as an answer for
provocateurs.
As argued above, I think it is clear that the later action is morally required. To the extent that
DeGirolami wishes to reserve the term “justification” for praiseworthy acts, then there is some truth to
the matter that those who owe a duty for having created peril are not performing justified actions. That
simply depends upon whether one should group the morally right with the morally obligatory. Still, it
seems clear that the t2 act must be done and must be afforded a defense.
With respect to provocateurs, DeGirolami does little to explain why the culpability at t1 changes the
nature of the conduct at t2. I agree that it does, but we need a fuller account than the one at which
DeGirolami gestures. I do not agree that culpability in causing can simply eliminate the justificatory
nature of the later act because of something about justifications. Rather, it is how the t1 act relates to
the t2 act that offers a substantive understanding of the later t2 act.
22
23

Id. at 31.
DeGirolami (2009).
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II.

The Use of Defensive Force by Provocateurs and Initial Aggressors

As discussed in the introduction, the claim that I am making is that provocateurs forfeit defensive rights,
just as initial aggressors do, and that this forfeiture explains why initial aggressors and provocateurs are
not permitted to engage in defensive force. In this section, I want to make a few general points about
the nature of this claim, and then I want to sharpen our focus by distinguishing between aggressors and
provocateurs.
A. Self-Defense is Not (Always)24a Lesser Evils Justification
Robinson views one virtue of his approach to be its single approach to the problem across doctrines.25 I
do not think this works. The reason it does not work is because it presupposes that self-defense is a
choice of evils defense and therefore that its analysis should follow the same process as necessity.
However, it is extraordinarily doubtful that self-defense may be fully explained by a lesser-evils analysis.
Consider the problems with this position. First, one must still give an account of why the culpable
aggressor’s life is discounted.26 After all, why isn’t the balance between the aggressor and the defender
simply a draw? And indeed, how do we balance these lives if, in all other respects, the culpable
aggressor has more value for society (a doctor working on the cure for cancer) than his innocent victim
(a criminal law theorist)?27 Second, the consequentialist view seems to indicate that if many culpable
aggressors attacked a lone innocent defender, there would be a point at which the balance would tip in
favor of the aggressors.28 But that simply cannot be right. You get to kill as many bad guys as threaten
you.29
Moreover, consequentialist accounts are problematic even if we include the value of having a more
general rule of self-defense. First, such a rule seems too narrow. If we simply want to deter violence,
we might prefer a far broader rule, allowing for retaliation or other “punitive” acts.30 Second, and more
importantly, the approach seems to lose the importance of the relationship between the defender and
the aggressor. According to this account, the defender’s act is not justified because the aggressor aims
to harm her, but because of some greater societal value. And, this view also leads to the conclusion that
a given defender is not justified in a case in which the action would not deter others’ aggression. But,
we would think that a culpable aggressor may still be killed in these instances.
To put this point another way, to view self-defense as serving some broader societal goal is to make it
contingent.31 Because the law will not be in a position to calculate in every instance, we will have a
24

When there are innocents on both sides, numbers and balancing matters. Alexander (1993, p. 61) (noting “the
most plausible moral theory underlying common intuitions about self-defense is one that would be sensitive to,
among other things, (1) number of deaths, (2) relative moral fault, (3) fair allocation of risks and incentives, and (4)
nonappropriation of others”).
25
Robinson (1985, p. 26).
26
Kadish (1976, p. 882); Wasserman (1987, p. 358).
27
Wasserman (1987, p. 359).
28
Id.
29
Kadish (1976 p. 882).
30
Id. at 883; Wasserman (1987, p. 360).
31
Kadish (1976, p. 883).
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broad rule prohibiting aggression. However, in any individual case, it may be that that rule is over
inclusive and the defender should not have the right to self-defense. However, it seems extraordinarily
odd to think that the permission to use self-defensive force is dependent upon the right long-term
consequences.
B. Liability Cases of Self-Defense Alter the Normative Relationship Between Aggressor and Defender
Although self-defense is a justification within criminal law, I take some instances of self-defense to ask
questions prior to our categorization or understanding of defenses themselves (and certainly prior to
the debate over the nature of justification).32 If Jane takes a computer that is on the table, whether she
has even committed an offense depends on whether the laptop was abandoned; or Jane was given
permission to use it by Fred, the owner; or Fred gave the laptop to Jane; or Fred had not given Jane
permission to use it. That is, to understand when one person has harmed another’s legally protected
interest, well, you need to know to whom the interest belongs.
Liability cases of self-defense are similar to these other usages of normative powers.33 Because liability
is an independent ground of permissibility, let me spend a minute defining the scope of the claim about
self-defense. Ultimately, because provocateurs alter their rights in a similar manner, examination of
liability-based instances of permissible self-defense is the place to start.
In analyzing self-defense, the first question is to figure out what we mean by “self-defense.” As a matter
of ordinary language our use of the term is extensive – I kill the Villainous Aggressor who tries to kill me
in self-defense; I kill the rabid dog that is about to bite me in self-defense;34 indeed, I even destroy your
television that is flying at me during a tornado in self-defense.35 Rather than assume that we ought to
offer one normative justification for self-defense – one that will necessarily run roughshod over
important nuances if it is to offer an account that includes villains and televisions—I think it is best to
think of self-defense as a type of defense, where different tokens (or subtypes, at least) may be
normatively justified for different reasons.36

32

For a survey of the debate, see Ferzan (2011).
Accord Bergelson (2009, p. 110) (“If we were to define the principle of conditionality of rights in Hohfeld’s terms,
it would be characterized as the victims’ power to change the balance of rights (in the broad sense) between
themselves and the perpetrators.”). Bergelson explains self-defense in terms of this conditionality: “If you try to kill
me, you violate your duty to me and thus lose moral parity with me. That loss of moral parity reduces your right to
inviolability and allows me to disregard it to the extent necessary to protect my right to life.” Id. at 105.
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Indeed, in the case of Jimbo on South Park, the claim, “It’s coming right for us!” allowed evasion of all hunting
regulations. (South Park, Season 1, Episode 3, Volcano).
35
One reader suggested to me that he would not deem this “self-defense” but rather “self-preservation.” But this
only proves my point. Arguing about ordinary language usage and then theorizing from there is not particularly
useful. Eugene Volokh uses the term self-defense for the killing of bacteria in one’s own body. Volokh (2007, pp.
1814-1815). I reject the usage. But what does that prove?
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It is thus useful to distinguish between defender-centered theories of permissibility and aggressor
liability-centered theories of permissibility.37 Within the self-defense literature, theorists struggle with
how to explain why it is permissible to kill a culpable aggressor, someone who intends to cause you
harm; an innocent aggressor, someone who will engage in a voluntary act that will harm you but lacks a
culpable mental state because of mistake, immaturity, insanity, and the like; and an innocent threat,
someone whose body will cause you harm but the bodily movement was involuntary such as a push.
In other work, I have argued that liability is its own interesting conceptual and normative path to
permissibility, and the reason it is permissible to kill culpable aggressors is because they are liable to
defensive force.38 (Importantly, I have not maintained that liability is a necessary requirement for
permissibility.) The “liability” formulation belongs to Jeff McMahan: “At least part of what it means to
say that a person is liable to attack is that he would not be wronged by being attacked, and would have
no justified complaint about being attacked.”39 McMahan further explains that being liable to attack
just is having forfeited one’s right not to be attacked.40 Elsewhere, I have argued that a culpable
aggressor forfeits his moral complaint against defensive force being used against him.41 We can see the
trappings of the loss of the right in the following possible implications: the number of aggressors does
not matter; the aggressor is not entitled to compensation in tort for harms inflicted; third parties may
aid the defender but not the aggressor; and the aggressor may not fight back. On the other hand, I have
argued that innocent aggressors and threats do not forfeit their rights. If one kills an innocent
aggressor, it is certainly more debatable as to whether numbers do not matter or whether third parties
should aid them or you.42 Hence, if it is permissible to kill an innocent aggressor, the permissibility is not
grounded in the aggressor’s liability, as he has done nothing to forfeit his rights, but rather there is some
other reason why you are permitted to infringe his right.43 (Similarly, one may turn the familiar runaway
trolley but not because the lone individual is liable to be killed. You are just permitted to infringe his
right.)44
C. Distinguishing Provocateurs From Aggressors
Although both provocateurs and initial aggressors alter the underlying moral landscape, they do so in
different ways. The important contrast to draw then is between the liability inherent in self-defense and
37

This suggestion seems to originate in McMahan (1994). McMahan has continually distinguished these concepts
in his work. It was made quite explicit by Frowe (2010).
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Ferzan (forthcoming).
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McMahan (2009, pp. 8-9).
40
Id. at 10.
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See Ferzan (forthcoming).
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Alexander (1993, p. 62).
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Ferzan (forthcoming); see also Bergelson (2009, p. 76)(distinguishing culpable and innocent aggressors and
arguing that the latter’s rights are overridden).
44
Dressler rejects a forfeiture theory for self-defense, arguing that it is over and under inclusive. Dressler (1982, p.
454). It is under inclusive, he claims, because it cannot explain innocent aggressors. I agree that this is true, but as
noted above, reject that we need one theory for self-defense. Dressler argues that it is over inclusive because it
would seem to allow the defender to kill the aggressor even when it is unnecessary. I demur. We alter our rights
and duties in fine-grained ways. I can give you permission to use my car only on Tuesdays when it is snowing.
When one forfeits one’s right against defensive force, one forfeits one’s right against defensive force.
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the loss of rights that stems from the provocateur’s act. We can put innocent aggressors and innocent
threats to the side because the permissibility of harming them is not grounded in their liability. Rather, if
one is permitted to kill innocent aggressors or innocent threats, the rationale will be something akin to
an agent-relative permission to prefer one’s life to others’.45
What distinguishes (culpable) aggressors from provocateurs? As a matter of ordinary language, we
might start with something as simple as: provocateurs provoke and aggressors aggress. But that is not
particularly helpful. Rather, I think the distinction lies in how the normative relationship is affected by
the actor (be she a provocateur or aggressor) and the respondent. Namely, what aggressors do, but
provocateurs do not, is engage in behavior that renders them liable to defensive force.
When an aggressor attacks her victim, by say, pointing a gun at her and saying, “I am going to kill you,”
she forfeits her right against the defender using force aimed at preventing the threatened harm from
coming to fruition. When a provocateur says, “I slept with your husband,” the respondent may engage
in force – and the wrongfulness of that force is something to be explored below -- but it seems clear
even at this point in the discussion that we can say that the force that is used is not intended to be
defensive force.
Jurisdictions conflate these actors but they are importantly distinct.46 Consider State v. Riley, in which
the Washington Supreme Court devoted paragraphs (of dicta) to the question of whether “mere words”
would be sufficient to constitute provocation such that an “initial aggressor” instruction ought to be
given when a defendant claims self-defense.47 That is, the defendant claimed that his use of words
about the victim being only a “wanna be” in his gang did not rise to the level of warranting an initial
aggressor instruction (the giving of which the defendant claimed violated his First Amendment rights).48
Because there was evidence suggesting that the defendant did more than just verbally taunt the victim,
the court did not need to decide the mere words issue. Nevertheless, the court stated, “we hold that
words alone do not constitute sufficient provocation.”49 One of the court’s primary arguments for this
position was that:
such a rule would effectively permit violence by a “victim” of mere words, contrary to the
underpinnings of the initial aggressor doctrine. As noted, the initial aggressor doctrine is based
45

Alexander and Ferzan (2009, pp. 136-141); Quong (2009, pp. 516-19).
See, e.g., People v. Barnard, 567 N.E.2d 60 (1991) (“mere words may be enough to qualify one as an initial
aggressor”). There is even some slippage in discussions, see, e.g., Robinson (1985, p. 6) (“Rather than using the
term ‘provoke,’ some jurisdictions deny self-defense if the actor is the ‘initial aggressor.’”).
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976 P.2d 624 (Wash. 1999)(en banc).
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Washington’s aggressor instruction is as follows:
No person may, by any intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response, create a
necessity to act in self defense and thereupon use, offer or attempt to use force upon or toward another
person. Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the aggressor, and the
defendant’s acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense is not available as a
defense.
Id. at 627 (citing II Wash. Pattern Jury Instructions; Crim. 16.04 (2d ed. 1994)). The instruction conflates aggression
and provocation -- provocateurs “provoke” “belligerent” responses but aggressors “commence” fights.
49
Id. at 628.
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upon the principle that the aggressor cannot claim self-defense because the victim of the
aggressive act is entitled to respond with lawful force. For the victim’s use of force to be lawful,
the victim must reasonably believe he or she was in danger of imminent harm. However, mere
words alone do not rise to reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm.50
As should be clear, the problem is that by linking provocateurs to aggressors, the court misses the fact
that the reason why a provocateur is not entitled to respond cannot be the same as the reason why the
aggressor is not entitled to respond. Indeed, but-for the fact that initial aggressors can regain defensive
rights (by withdrawing), there would be no need for an initial aggressor instruction. The aggressor uses
unjust force; the defender responds with just force; and therefore, the aggressor is not entitled to
respond with force. This is just the upshot of the clear conceptual linkage between aggression and selfdefense. Provocateurs are importantly distinct in that their behavior does not—contra the court’s view
– justify the violent response. (Even to the extent that provocation is seen as a partial justification, the
behavior does not fully justify the respondent’s use of force, which still makes these actors distinct from
initial aggressors.)
Notably, Judge Talmadge, writing a concurrence, sees exactly the problem. He rejects the majority’s
position that
No matter what one says, no matter how provocative, no matter what the circumstance of the
provocation, a speaker may always assert self-defense if attacked by the person the speaker
provokes into attacking, and the State is never entitled to an aggressor instruction. The
majority’s rule defies human nature. 51
The judge then offers hypothetical cases to prove his point. Here is his hypothetical that I employed in
the introduction:
Imagine a funeral ceremony with hundreds of mourners for a widely respected AfricanAmerican civil rights leader. A white supremacist appears at the church and begins shouting
nonthreatening, racial epithets. Enraged mourners rush the person, who pulls out a concealed
gun and kills several of them. At his trial for murder, he argues self-defense.52
Judge Talmadge then notes, “Under the majority’s reasoning, because he used only words to provoke
the attack, the white supremacist was not the aggressor and the State is not entitled to an aggressor
instruction.”53
Because aggressors start the fight, their forfeiture of defensive rights naturally flows from how their
behavior changes the normative relationship between aggressor and defender.54 The only necessary
50

Id. at 629.
Id. at 630.
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Id. at 631.
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Id.
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Cf. Herrmann (1986, pp. 750-751) (noting the problems with assimilating provocateurs to aggressors, as
provocateurs are not guilty of attempts). There are two classes of cases that lie at the provocateur/aggressor
border. One group involves Inchoate Aggressors, those whose conduct does constitute an attack but whose
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tweaks then come when (1) there is a difference in proportionality between A’s use of nondeadly force
and D’s return with deadly force and (2) A has ceased to aggress and the conditions under which he
regains his defensive rights must be specified. (I’m not denying that these are complex tweaks, just that
they do not affect the central case.) Provocateurs, on the other hand, need more specific rules because
their conduct does not ground the permissibility of the respondent to act (he still acts wrongly) and
because they are less able to unring the provocative bell. (“I’ve stopped attacking you!” is an easier
claim to give normative force to then “Sorry I pissed you off on purpose! Takesy backsies.”)55 When an
aggressor stops an attack, there is no need to defend. When a provocateur incites anger and rage, there
is no way to undo the damage.

III.

Provocateurs, Provocation, and Provocation Mitigation

conduct is not sufficient for the defender to respond because of additional requirements for the defender, such as
imminence. The other group includes Culpable Apparent Threats. These individuals intend to make the defender
believe that they are attacking but lack the actual ability to carry out the threat (for example, robbing a store with
an unloaded gun). I would cast both of these actors on the aggressor side, as opposed to deeming them
provocateurs. See Ferzan (forthcoming). Specifically, Inchoate Aggressors meet my condition 1(a) and Culpable
Apparent Threats meet condition 1(b).
55
To further complicate matters, an actor could be both an aggressor with respect to non-deadly force and a
provocateur with respect to deadly force.
Interestingly, in many jurisdictions, if one intentionally provokes with the purpose of creating a defense, one
cannot recover one’s right to defend by withdrawal; whereas, if one otherwise provokes or aggresses, one can
withdraw and recover the right to defend. Kansas’ statute (Ks. Stat. §21-3241) is representative:
The justification described in sections 21-3211, 21-3212, and 21-3213, is not available to a person who:
(1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony; or
(2) Initially provokes the use of force against himself or another, with intent to use such force as an excuse
to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
(3) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself or another, unless:
(a) He has reasonable ground to believe that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and
he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is
likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or
(b) In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the
assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or
resumes the use of force.
However, there must be a point at which the provocateur regains the rights he has forfeited. After all, it cannot be
that a provocative act should render one defenseless in perpetuity. Thus, the Model Penal Code is certainly right
to have a “in the same encounter” sort of restriction. I will not further explore this complexity here.
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If we agree that the question at issue is rights forfeiture (or specification, or conditionality, depending
on one’s view of rights),56 then there are still questions we need to answer: (1) Does the provocateur
forfeit rights and (2) by virtue of what is the rights forfeiture accomplished? If we are trying to
understand a principle of rights forfeiture for provocateurs, the natural starting point is with the
literature on when the respondent is entitled to mitigation for legally adequate provocation. Ultimately,
I will argue that this is a theoretical dead end, but an instructive dead end nevertheless.
A. Provocateurs and Provocation
Who is a provocateur? First, let us make one important distinction. A respondent may be provoked by
an act without the person who committed that act being deemed a provocateur.57 That is, we must
distinguish, “provocation” from “provocateur.” An act can incite someone toward violence, even if the
person who committed that act was not aware of its inciting properties. For instance, imagine that Ed is
sleeping with Sally, but does not know, nor does he have any reason to know, that Sally is married. If
Sally’s husband Stan finds the two in bed together and shoots Ed, Ed’s actions certainly provoked Stan’s
response. However, Ed, it seems, should not count as a provocateur as he was unaware of the fact that
his actions could even have that effect.58
Notice that this yields that even if Stan would be entitled to mitigation for provocation, Ed is not a
provocateur. At least, given that the question is when do provocateurs forfeit rights, it seems that even
though Stan is provoked, we should not consider Ed to have forfeited his defensive rights. I think we
would need a positive argument about why strict liability as to inciting a deadly affray should cause one
to lose defensive rights.59 I doubt that one will be forthcoming.
B. Provocateurs and Provocation Mitigation
Indeed, in understanding provocateurs, I think it is also critical to notice that those conditions that
render an actor a “provocateur” need not be identical to those conditions that entitle an actor to a
provocation defense. A provocateur may provoke an individual into engaging in conduct that the
individual is still not permitted to do. Thus, it should not matter whether the provocateur’s conduct
partially exculpates the respondent. A defendant is entitled to mitigation from murder to manslaughter
when he meets the requirements provocation, including both legally adequate provocation and heat of
passion.60 Early English law set forth the types of conduct that were legally adequate, such as
aggravated assault, and it specifically excluded mere words.61 Although modern case law looks to
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Following David Rodin, I think nothing turns on how we conceive of rights for these purposes. See Rodin (2002,
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I owe this point to Mike Cahill.
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conduct that would provoke a reasonable person, many jurisdictions still retain the common law rule
that “mere words” are never legally adequate provocation.62
It is important, however, to distinguish between what should partially justify or excuse the respondent
and what should constitute behavior sufficient for rights forfeiture by the provocateur. Consider
Girouard v. State.63 After a whirlwind courtship, Girouard had known his wife only five months when he
overheard her telling a friend she was going to ask for a hardship transfer because her husband no
longer loved her. (They were both in the army.) Girouard asked his wife about the conversation, and
when she responded that she meant “nothing,” he kicked away her dinner plate and stormed off into
the bedroom. Girouard’s wife followed him into the bedroom, stepped onto the bed and onto his back,
and pulled his hair, stating, “What are you going to do, hit me?” She then insulted him, claiming she
never wanted to marry him, that he was a terrible in bed (in far more colorful language), and that he
reminded her of her father (who may have impregnated her when she was fourteen). She then told him
that she had filed charges of abuse against him and that he would probably be court martialed. (She
had not in fact filed such charges.) When she stopped, the defendant asked if everything said was true,
and she affirmed that she had really done these things. He left and got a kitchen knife which he held
under a pillow as he returned to the bedroom. At trial, he claimed that he kept waiting for her to say
that she was only kidding, but instead, she claimed the marriage was a mistake, that she would claim
her brain-damaged sister as a dependent and have her move in, and that she did not love him and
wanted a divorce. She then asked him what he was going to do. Enraged, Girouard stabbed his wife
nineteen times. (He then tried to kill himself but failed.)
The issue before the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether mere words should be sufficient
provocation. It held that they should not, noting “We perceive no reason for holding in favor of those
who find the easiest way to end a domestic dispute is by killing the offending spouse.”64
We might ask whether a per se rule against mere words makes sense for the provocation defense. After
all, if we are talking about whether to partially excuse the defendant, then he seems to have a valid
argument that mere words can make him extraordinarily angry. However, even if we think that there
are good reasons for the denial of a provocation defense—and notably, even where a defense exists it
only partially mitigates—the question of whether the provocateur should be deemed to have lost rights
should not turn on the standard to which we wish to hold the respondent. Even if the respondent is
weak or hot-tempered, the provocateur’s responsibility in pushing those buttons should not be
disregarded. Just as there is no moral reason to require parity between initial aggressors and
provocateurs, there is no reason to require that the basis of the provocateur’s rights forfeiture be coextensive with the conditions under which an individual is partially excused because of provocation.
That is, imagine that the wife devised the plan to provoke her husband so that he would attack her so
that she could kill him. Even if he does wrong by attacking her, she has said these words for the very
purpose of creating the affray. The court’s normative goal to set standards of behavior during domestic
62
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disputes simply has no purchase when asking whether individuals who initiate fights should forfeit
defensive rights.
At this point, it is important to note where we are in the argument. So far, I have not provided any
positive account of when a provocateur forfeits his rights. Thus, I am not claiming that the utterance of
insults is itself sufficient to forfeit one’s defensive rights. That question has yet to be answered. My
only goal to this point has been to untether the analysis of that question from the question of what
constitutes legally adequate provocation.
C. Provocateurs’ Rights and the “Partial Justification” Theory of the Provocation Defense
If our aim is to understand when provocateurs are culpable and when they forfeit rights, we have now
eliminated two dead ends. One is that we cannot understand provocateurs simply by analyzing acts that
are provoking. Second, we cannot understand provocateurs by analyzing when a respondent is entitled
to a provocation defense.
We may ask, however, whether the theoretical understanding of the provocation defense could shed
some light on the question of how provocateurs forfeit rights. To this point, I have eschewed the use of
justification and excuse, and I have also argued that provocateurs need not act in a way that grounds a
provocation defense for the provocateur to lose rights. Yet, in this section, I intend to look specifically at
provocation and even the question of whether it is a justification or an excuse. Let me explain.
With self-defense, the reason why a defender is entitled to act is because an aggressor is liable to
defensive force. Provocation, a defense which reduces murder to manslaughter, does not look like this
because the provocateur is not liable to defensive force. Yet to ask the question whether the
provocateur “had it coming” requires further analysis of the provocateur’s rights, and the best analysis
of these rights exists within the literature that says that the responder is partially justified in using force
against the provocateur. The questions are whether that is true and if so, why it is so. To skip to the
conclusion, I will ultimately claim that the partial justification view cannot explain why provocateurs
cannot fight back.
The first thing to note is that one need not adopt one rationale for when provocation mitigates. Indeed,
Vera Bergelson argues that some instances of provocation are partial excuse and partial justification and
other instances are simply partial excuse.65 So, we might have two different accounts of the mitigation.
65

Bergelson also notes that the label “provocation” masks different claims, though she carves up the pie
differently than I:
[T]he current law of provocation shelters under its roof two conceptually different defenses. The first,
“true” provocation, is a mix of partial justification and partial excuse. Its justificatory capacity stems from
the responsive character of the perpetrator’s attack on the provoker who was the initial aggressor and
violated some important legal rights of the perpetrator….
The other defense, which, for the sake of clarity, may be called the “heat of passion,” is purely excusatory.
It applies in the circumstances when the perpetrator does not have a legal right that the victim act in a
certain way but has some moral claim or legitimate expectation that the events that caused his loss of
control not happen.
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Moreover, the goal here is not to rationalize existing doctrine but to get to the heart of the underlying
moral questions.
Notably, there seem to be cases in which our intuitions favor killing the provocateur. In the movie
Gladiator, Commodus tells Maximus about how Maximus’ wife and son were murdered, reporting that
his son "squealed like pig when he was nailed to the cross," and his wife "moaned like a whore when she
was ravished again and again and again..." When Maxium kills Commodus, the audience does not think,
“Well, there is an instance of legally adequate provocation. His rationality was diminished and he is
certainly entitled to a partial excuse.” The audience applauds. No one argues that Maximus should go
to jail at all. When we cheer for Maximus we do so because Commodus is getting what he deserves, not
because of the taunting words but because of Commodus’ role in the commission of the underlying acts.
There are two notable features about the case (1) a crime that deserves substantial punishment has
been committed and (2) there is a corruption of the legal order such that we cannot expect the law to
administer justice.
Indeed, more generally, the argument that provocation is a partial justification must be grounded in the
fact that the provocateur deserves at least some of the harm he receives. Although the original grounds
for the provocation defense were based upon those acts that threatened a man’s honor, such that he
might be said to be “defending” his honor, the “required” retaliation should not be considered any sort
of true self-defense.66 Rather, the man’s actions are meant to demonstrate that he is the sort of
individual who views this conduct as a sufficient affront such that retaliation is proper, and he
demonstrates his manhood by responding in this way. To update the example a bit, if a mother saw her
child brutally murdered in front of her and did not respond with rage and violence, we might question
her motherhood status, but this is not to say that the conduct is designed to defend her motherhood
status as much as the very act is a demonstration of it. Indeed, as Horder later notes, the aim is not
defensive but retributive, and the reason why mitigation and not exculpation was appropriate was
because the punishment was too severe.67
If part of what grounds the provocation defense is that the provocateur gets what he deserves, and this
rationale exists irrespective of the emotional state of the actor, 68 one may question why there is also a
requirement that the respondent be in a particular emotional state. Although I need not answer this
question (as I am not attempting to justify the provocation defense but rather to see how we are to
understand the provocateur’s loss of rights), Berman and Farrell argue that “partial excuse and partial
justification are necessary and sufficient conditions for provocation manslaughter.”69 They reason that
although mitigating reasons flow from both excuse and justification reasoning, neither alone is sufficient

Bergelson (2009, p. 89).
66
Horder (1992, pp. 24-26).
67
Id. at 52.
68
Berman and Farrell (2011, p. 1069).
69
Id. at 1034.

18

to warrant a departure from murder.70 More importantly for our purposes here is the fact that
sometimes provocateurs act in such a way that they deserve injury, and it is this feature of desert that
reduces the wrongfulness of the respondent’s behavior.
Notably, if this desert feature is what renders the respondent’s conduct less wrongful, the questions of
when and whether the provocateur forfeits defensive rights are still left unexplained. Except in
Gladiator cases—that is cases with clear failures of rule of law and extraordinary desert where we seem
to have no problem with vigilantism or the death penalty—what a respondent does is to inflict excessive
punishment in violation of rule of law values. So, the desert account cannot fully explain why the
provocateur loses defensive rights. Hence, even understanding why provocation is a partial justification
cannot explain why the provocateur is not entitled to fight back against the residual unjustified force.

IV.

Provocateurs and Actio Libera in Causa

With a better understanding of provocateurs – one that distinguishes them from aggressors and from
the provocation’s mitigation provisions– we may now turn directly to provocateurs and what I view as
the two actio libera in causa puzzles for provocatuers. The first puzzle is what explains why
provocateurs can’t fight back. The second puzzle is whether in determining whatever those conditions
are at t1 that lead the provocateur not to fight back, we are to consider that sometimes the provocateur
views himself not simply as killing but rather as killing justifiably. That is, is the provocateur allowed to
take into account the later impermissibility of the respondent’s behavior in determining whether he may
engage in conduct at t1?
A. Provocateurs and Rights
Let’s start with cases in which we will assume the provocateur is not justified at t1 in provoking. (We will
reach the question next of how to determine when the provocateur’s action is justified.) How is it that
the provocateur alters his rights?
Unfortunately, the literature on this question has been tethered to the question of whether the
respondent is entitled to a provocation defense. As discussed above, these are two separate questions.
For instance, in analyzing provocation, Bergelson offers the “conditionality of rights” principle, a
principle that covers self-defense, provocation, and consent. But this is too broad.71 Normative powers
are likely to be more complex than one test.
Does the provocateur consent to be harmed? Typically, a person who consents to a harm waives a
moral complaint. His consent transforms the conduct.72 However, even if the provocateur wants to
70
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incite the respondent to hit him, the provocateur wants (perhaps he does not succeed, we shall see….)
to keep his moral complaint.73 That is, he claims the respondent still wrongs him by hitting him and that
is why he wants to be able to fight back. Our understanding of consent is also that it is more voluntary
than this; that is, when one consents to harm, one acquiesces to the contact that will occur. But this
seems far too strong for the provocateur. We don’t think, for example, that Charles Bronson is
acquiescing to being mugged.
Along similar lines, another approach would be to claim that the provocateur essentially harms himself
because he acts through the respondent.74 However, this approach presupposes that causation requires
an either/or comparison; in criminal law, it does not. Unlike tort law, where the responsibility pie is
limited to the damages the plaintiff suffers and therefore may be divided in proportion to responsibility,
criminal law has room to hold more than one person fully accountable for their actions.75 Both principal
and accomplice can go to jail for the offense. The problem then is why, if the provocateur is “harming
himself” and the respondent is “harming the provocateur,” the provocateur still loses standing to
defend against the respondent’s action.
The answer actually lies at the surface of the problem. Provocateurs forfeit defensive rights for the very
simple reason that provocateurs start the fight. They initiate fights without initiating aggression. They
are actually stealth aggressors. Although initial aggressors start fights by throwing first punches, stealth
aggressors start fights by inciting the other person to anger or otherwise causing the other person to do
violence.
This is just a sense of “asking for it.” What a provocateur does is to taunt someone in a way that he
knows creates the risk of a harmful retaliatory reaction. In the same way that one does not poke tigers
with sticks or swing at beehives with bats, one likewise cannot act in a way that one knows will provoke
and then complain about the reaction. (Admittedly, one may defend against bees and tigers, both
because of differences in the underlying normative relations and differences in the comparative value of
the person and animal.) Or to put the point another way, as any elementary age child will tell you, the
playground rule – “he started it” – has moral traction.
A provocateur creates the risk that another person will harm him by engaging in conduct that he knows
may produce a violent response, either because it will anger the respondent or otherwise give him a
reason to engage in violent conduct. Having created this risk of harm to himself, he forfeits his moral
complaint when this very risk materializes. It is true that this conduct is insufficient to justify the
respondent’s behavior, but sometimes, there are just two wrongdoers.
Moreover, to clarify, this forfeiture is a relational concept between the provocateur and the respondent.
If Iago can only save Desdemona from Othello by killing Othello, then Iago has a duty to kill Othello. The
fact that Iago has forfeited his right to use defensive force against an attack by Othello does not have
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any implications for Iago’s relationship to Othello. He cannot alter her rights. On the other hand, if a
third party rescue Desdemona by killing either Othello or Iago, then there would be complex questions
about whom the third party ought to privilege.
B. What the Provocateur Must Do to Forfeit His Defensive Rights
The next question, then, is what is required for this sort of moral forfeiture. With respect to
provocateurs, the law typically requires something extraordinarily narrow – purpose to provoke the
affray. Like complicity, there seems to be some implicit view within the law that one only identifies with
the wrong done by another if one purposefully causes it.
Cases in which the provocateur purposefully provokes the respondent’s attack appear to be rather clear
cases for such forfeiture. If Iago tells Othello he has been sleeping with Desdemona, does so knowing
that Othello is hot-headed and will attack him, and does so in order to kill Othello, it is difficult to see
why Iago should not be held to have started the fight in a such a way that he ought to relinquish his
defensive rights. His culpability and causal connection to the affray are exceedingly strong.
The question is whether a requirement of purpose is too strong. As Sandy Kadish has notes, there
seems to be no reason in principle to limit complicity to purposeful acts; knowledge and recklessness
ought to suffice.76 If Iago tells Othello that Desdemona is unfaithful, intending that Othello will kill her,
but also aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that Othello will also lash out against Iago, why
should Iago retain defensive rights against the very attack that he precipitated?
Notably, there seem to be good reasons for allowing negligent provocateurs to retain defensive rights.
My more general worries about negligence have been vetted elsewhere,77 but I think we have reason to
worry about a forfeiture principle that is not connected to a person knowing he is doing something
impermissible. Human relations and human anger are exceedingly complex and the respondent is still
engaging in conduct that he ought not to engage in. To take an extreme example, assume someone
utters a significant racial slur, completely oblivious to its inflammatory meaning, and this provokes an
attack from a member of the racial group. It seems rather extraordinary to think that this act is itself
going to be sufficient to warrant a moral principle preventing the negligent provocateur from defending
himself against the wrongful attack.
Indeed, a broader provocateur doctrine would likely turn tort law on its head. If Alice negligently drives
across the median and Bob has the ability to avert an accident, he is obliged to do so under the last clear
chance doctrine.78 But if Alice is deemed a provocateur, then any injury done by Bob would not wrong
Alice and so she would not be entitled to compensation in tort. This seems wrong. Bob, even if he is
annoyed by Alice, is not permitted to stand on his rights and hit her car.79
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Even if we require a subjective appreciation that one is provoking another toward violence, we would
then need to ask the question of whether one loses one’s defensive rights even when the risk is itself
justified.80 I think this would be too broad, as it would hold us hostage to the most despicable but
predictable actions of others. We need an account that is not so broad as to forbid defending against
rapists who attack the scantily clad but is not so narrow as to require violation of a legal right.81 We
need an account of unjustifiable provocation that respects the liberty interests we have in walking
streets, dressing immodestly, and speaking the truth.
Provocateurs also should not be able to forfeit their defensive rights through excused conduct. Consent
may be vitiated by force, fraud, and mistake. So, too, a shift of normative powers should not be possible
by those whose conduct is not voluntary (broadly construed).
Let me sum up. I have argued that provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights when they consciously
disregard the substantial and unjustifiable risk that their words or conduct will cause another person to
attack them.82 This means that it is only when a provocateur is subjectively aware that he is potentially
causing another to attack him that the provocateur forfeits his defensive rights. And, to be clear, the
provocateur should only forfeit employing the degree of force that he subjectively appreciates. If he
only foresees nondeadly force, then he only forfeits his right to use nondeadly force.
C. When Is the Provocateur’s Act Unjustifiable?
This formulation places extraordinary emphasis on the question of unjustifiability. Let me first make
some brief observations and then raise two rather complex puzzles embedded within this issue.
First, the question of whether the provocateur’s conduct created an unjustifiable risk does not affect the
impermissibility of the respondent’s response. He still is not allowed to attack in any event. We should
not forget that nothing about the provocateur’s forfeiture of his defensive right grounds the
permissibility of the respondent’s response. The response remains impermissible. Second, in
determining whether such risks are justified, we must take into account how our consequentialist
calculus is deontologically side-constrained. For instance, when Leo Katz asks about the gateway sin
paradox, where one will cause more good if one commits the “gateway sin,” the answer I would give is
that it depends upon whether the gateway sin requires the use of another person as a means.83 Unlike
those who endorse the doctrine of double effect or other formulation of our deontological constraints,
Larry Alexander and I have argued that our consequentialist calculus is constrained to the extent that
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one cannot use another as a mere means.84 And to me, it is only in context that we can determine
whether there was a gateway sin in the first place.
Third, the determination of the justifiability of uttering words is extraordinarily tricky. Words can
certainly form the basis of criminal liability, be it uttering “fire” in a crowded theater, issuing a threat, or
joining a conspiracy. However, we might first ask whether uttering true, but hurtful, facts should also be
justified. If it is true that Desdemona is cheating on Othello, is Iago behaving unjustifiably?85 This
arguably depends upon whether we place such a great premium on truth that it should be set free even
when the utterer knows that there is a substantial chance that the husband will kill his wife in
response.86 Another central question will be the role of the First Amendment. Although “fighting
words” are not constitutionally protected,87 picketing outside a funeral under certain conditions is.88
Given the narrow holding of Snyder v. Phelps, there is certainly room for argument as to how to draw
the line between important if unwelcome speech and unjustifiably risky speech. Our moral
determination of justifiability may thus be constrained by Constitutional law.
Now, the big(ger) issues. First, the question of whether the provocateur’s conduct is unjustifiable is
ultimately part of the puzzle about when we are permitted to engage in actions that may encourage
impermissible conduct by another. This is no small puzzle. The criminal law evades this question with
doctrines that actually proceed in opposite directions. On the one hand, as noted above, criminal law
doctrines on solicitation and complicity (and attempt) require purpose. This means that there is no
criminal liability for the actor who provides the address of a known drug dealer or hands a knife to
another prison inmate, even when both actors know they are facilitating criminal acts and are providing
substantial assistance.89 The fear here seems to be that we become our brothers’ keepers. However,
rather than spending any effort sorting out the question of when we ought to be at liberty not to inquire
further and when we ought to be responsible for others’ acts, the criminal law draws a bright line at
purpose. On the other hand, criminalization decisions sometimes implicitly rely on the potential
wrongdoing of others to justify criminal laws. For instance, if I am a well-trained gun owner who lives
alone and is not around children, then a law that restricts my gun ownership is a law the prevents me
from doing a justifiable act because others might do wrong (say, by stealing my gun). Similarly, the
criminalization of drugs on the basis that some actors will do wrong restricts the liberty of others who
will not. Our liberty is thus restricted by the potential wrongdoing of others. But the criminal law’s
method of restricting our actions because of others’ potential wrongdoing is opaque to us, as it does not
operate through the doctrine of complicity.
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Resolving how and when we are responsible for the wrongdoing of others is extraordinarily complex,
and I certainly cannot solve that problem now. What is important to note for our purposes is that it is
just this solution that we need to fully understand the contours of provocation forfeiture. After all, if
Bully threatens Victim that if she leaves her house, he will shoot her, then Victim knows that she is
consciously disregarding the substantial risk that she will need to act in self-defense if she leaves. The
question then is whether leaving the house is justified, not whether leaving the house is legal.90 The
reason she may leave, even knowing that she will be attacked, is because the initial action is not
culpable, even including that it may lead to a later need to kill. Interests need to be fully articulated and
debated to understand fully when and why a particular act would lead the provocateur to forfeit her
rights.
This brings us to the final puzzle. Is the provocateur entitled to consider that his response will be
justified in determining the initial culpability of his conduct? Sometimes at t1 we act so as to be able to
act justifiably later and we are entitled to take this later justifiability into account in determining
whether to engage in the conduct at t1. Carl is entitled to apply for a job as an executioner because he
wants to justifiably kill people. Debbie is entitled to drive an ambulance because she wants to justifiably
speed through red lights. A police officer is allowed to act undercover and even encourage another to
commit a crime so that a gang can be brought down. In these cases, the act at t1 is causally linked to an
act that is justifiable at t2.
This brings us back to Bronson. Why can’t Charles Bronson say that all he did was cause a bad guy to try
to kill him and that allowed him to act in self-defense? More generally, assume a provocateur acts at t1
in such a way so as to provoke the respondent to try to kill him so that the provocateur can kill him at t2.
Is the correct question, “May one engage in conduct so that one may purposefully kill?” or is the correct
question, “May one engage in conduct so that one may purposefully and justifiably kill?” That is, can the
provocateur build in the justifiability of his conduct at t2 in determining whether his culpable and
therefore impermissible at t1?
Finkelstein and Katz present this as a question of whether “we must assess plans—or component parts
of plans—in the context of the overall moral character of the entire package.”91 Certainly, we do. An
action at t1’s justifiability critically depends upon its effects at t2 and the reasons for causing these t2
effects. What I reject here, however, is that even taking into account that he would be acting in what is
otherwise justifiable self-defense, Bronson’s conduct is justified at t1. In my view, Bronson cannot act at
t1 because his conduct purposefully aims to usurp the role of the state, and this is an impermissible goal.
Let us parse three cases:
Dolores Claiborne: Dolores Claiborne lives with her physically abusive alcoholic husband and her
teenage daughter in Maine. Once Dolores discovers that her husband is molesting the daughter
and that her husband has stolen all of Dolores’ private savings with which to leave, Dolores plots
her husband’s demise. She buys him alcohol and then verbally taunts him, so that he will chase
90
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though the field on their property. Dolores, who has previously almost fallen down a hole in the
field, has covered the hole. She jumps over it; he falls in; and she leaves him to die.
Shane: In this Western, Jack Palance plays Jack Wilson, a gun slinger hired by antagonist, Rufus
Ryker, who is trying to force homesteaders off their land. When one homesteader approaches
where Wilson is standing, it is clear that Wilson is to shoot the homesteader but to make it look
“right” to witnesses. Wilson therefore proceeds to insult the South and Southerners, which
provokes the homesteader to draw his gun. Wilson, quicker on the draw, shoots the
homesteader.
Death Wish: After muggers kill his wife and rape his daughter, Charles Bronson’s character goes
on a vigilante spree. On streets, subways, and parks, he poses as a victim, so that when
attacked he can kill his attacker.
Let’s cleanly separate out the various factors. In Dolores Claiborne, the husband is molesting the
daughter. The audience is led to believe that the wife is in a situation where she will not be able to end
the abuse and save her daughter. We are told, by Dolores’ employer, “Sometimes being a bitch is all a
woman has to hold on to.” The husband deserves quite a bit of punishment. The state is not going to
give it to him. Although from personal conversations I know that there are those who think she did
nothing wrong, that seems to go too far. After all, she gets him intoxicated, taunts him so he will
attempt to kill her, and leads him on a chase so that he will fall down a hole she has covered up and she
herself jumps over. But even if all of that was permissible, she still had a duty to rescue him. It is only
because we believe the system will fail her that we don’t condemn her. Death Wish likewise raises
issues as to law enforcement and the rule of law. We like to know there is justice in the world (or at
least at the movies).
In addition, there still seems to be something that distinguishes Death Wish from Shane.92 In Shane,
Wilson’s intention is to kill the homesteader. He chooses to do this by means of calling it self-defense.
In this case, Wilson will fail if he does not kill the homesteader. On the other hand, in Death Wish,
Bronson would be perfectly happy if the world had no muggers. That is, his intention is to kill bad guys,
if and only if such bad guys exist. If there are no bad guys, then Bronson does not fail in his intention.
There is a significant difference between those who create situations so that they can kill, and those
who engage in actions that put them in a position to justifiably kill only if necessary. If the actor’s failure
to kill constitutes a failure of his plan and action, then his reasons for action are clearly impermissible.
This is to be contrasted with why it is permissible for the speed demon to become an ambulance driver
and the blood thirsty executioner to kill. Their intentions are only to engage in conduct that is lawful,
but they do not engage in conduct in order to create those very circumstances. Therefore, Wilson is
culpable in Shane because his reason for action is to kill, and he engages in the conduct designed to
create those circumstances.

92

Thanks to Mitch Berman for suggesting to me this parsing of the cases.

25

This is not to say that Bronson is not also a provocateur, but that the reasons are different. Now,
turning to Death Wish more directly, what should we say about Bronson’s conduct? Paul Robinson
clearly places the protagonist on the culpable side of the divide: “Perhaps the ‘grand schemer’ best
known in popular culture is the vigilante character of the 1974 movie, ‘Death Wish,’ who deliberately
takes late-night walks and subway rides to place himself in threatening situations where he could kill the
muggers who tried to attack him.”93
Recall that what provocateurs do is to affect the respondent’s reasons for action, typically by creating
new ones. Iago tells Othello that Desdemona is cheating on him. By his words, Iago aims to influence
Othello’s behavior. We might analogize this to the entrapment defense.94 No one finds it remotely
problematic for police to merely leave a wallet out for someone to find. Creating opportunities seems
unproblematic. Thus, it is tempting to say here that what one can do, and Bronson does, is to merely
create an opportunity, and this is entirely permissible.
As I argue elsewhere, one concern underlying entrapment is about external actors pulling the strings on
our circumstantial luck.95 In many ways, I think that we feel “But for the grace of God go I” and so, we
might worry that there are circumstances at which we would meet our price, either by threat or offer.
One thus tries to manage one’s life to avoid such situations. What both the provocateur and the
entrapping officer do then, is to shift our opportunities in a way that may reveal the worst about us.
The police, it might be thought, are entitled to make slight but not extraordinary shifts in another’s
circumstantial luck. So, if a police officer poses as a marijuana dealer, then the buyer cannot complain
that she picked the police officer. And importantly, that seems to be partly driven by the fact that if the
buyer did not buy from this cop, the buyer would buy from another.
What though to say about the provocateur? Notice that what the provocateur does is to ultimately
reveal that under certain conditions the respondent will behave wrongly. May the provocateur play God
so as to justifiably rid us of a potential wrongdoer?
The problem Bronson’s conduct is that he is a vigilante. Although he may attempt to flush out the evil
tendencies of others, the question is why he should be entitled to play that role. What he aims to do is
to give people their just deserts under the guise of preventive force. He aims to replace the state. The
problem about making oneself judge, jury, and executioner is that one is, in fact, taking over a role that
has been delegated to the state. In the absence of a well-functioning legal order, we might revisit
whether Bronson may act as he does. We could still worry about the differences in proportionality
between the harm employed as a matter of prevention and the harm deserved as a matter of retributive
justice. But then our complaint would be narrower. However, within our legal order, private citizens
are not permitted to play both God and government and rid the world of wrongdoers. The
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unjustifiability of the conduct is thus the extent to which this behavior violates the rule of law values
that the criminal justice system serves. This leaves open that sometimes the events at t2 will justify the
risk at t1 – indeed, this must be true for us to lead our lives when we predict the future choices we may
face.
To summarize the argument, the question was whether the justifiability of the act at t2 affects the
justifiability of the act at t1. The answer to this is yes. But in some cases, the provocateur will not be
justified at t1 because his reasons for creating the risk are themselves unjustifiable. In some instances,
this is because the provocateur is just a killer, whose aim is to kill – he creates the justifying
circumstances merely as a means for doing what he intends to do anyway: kill another. This is
impermissible. In other cases, the provocateur may have more protective goals, such as the flushing out
of bad guys, to the extent that they exist. But it is not the job of the individual citizen to engage in such
behavior, and thus, this conduct, too, is impermissible at t1. This conclusion, however, is contingent the
existence of a well-functioning state.
Conclusion
Criminal law scholarship’s failure to be sufficiently attentive to the way that the normative landscape
may be changed by the conduct of the actors renders scholars ill-equipped to articulate why a
provocateur cannot fight in her defense. This is not a matter of understanding defenses. Or
justifications. It is a matter of understanding how sometimes, you get exactly what you ask for. And at
those times, you simply have to take it.
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